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1TED UNDERWOOD
Stories of Parallel Lives
and the Status Anxieties
of Contemporary Historicism
I     , the meaning of postmodernism be-
came a topic of contention. Was it a discrete artistic movement, a structural trans-
formation of modernity as a whole, ormerely a convenient synonym for ‘‘the period
after the Second World War’’? Though advocates and critics of postmodernity de-
ﬁned the term diﬀerently, they did concur on one point. The evocation of bygone
eras that characterized postmodern art, ﬁction, and ﬁlm was not to be taken at face
value. Postmodern historical ﬁction, for instance, was not a nostalgic re-creation of
nineteenth-century realism. It was rather (if you believed Linda Hutcheon) a play-
ful decentering of positivist epistemology, allowing readers to recognize history it-
self as a constructed narrative.1 If you preferred Fredric Jameson’s grimmer inter-
pretation, the historical turn in contemporary culture was a symptom of history’s
disappearance: the consciousness of historical diﬀerence that might have supported
nostalgia had vanished, to be replaced by a pastiche of interchangeable retro styles.2
If the large philosophical claims made for and against postmodern historical
ﬁction are now beginning to date, it is not because that mode of artistic production
sputtered out, but because it seems to have been subsumed in broader trends as it
matured. The frame-breaking gestures and stylistic quotation marks deployed by
the ‘‘historiographical metaﬁctions’’ of John Fowles and E. L. Doctorow were once
received as challenges (for good or ill) to the ‘‘transparency of historical referen-
tiality.’’3 The historical novels that have lately won prizes and metamorphosed into
motion pictures are equally self-conscious. But their metaﬁctional layering doesn’t
necessarily have the eﬀect of reminding the reader that history is a linguistic con-
struct. Novels like Possession and The Hours use metaﬁction not to distance the past
but to transmute historical representation into something like personal memory.
They achieve this in part by relying on the premise of parallel lives, which en-
twines historical diﬀerence with characters’ private yearnings for a lost past. Actors,
 Several novels and ﬁlms from the 1980s and 1990s hinge on a parallel between sets of lives
that unfold in diﬀerent historical periods. This article argues that the premise of parallel lives is a way of
grappling with a threat to the cultural and social status conferred by historicism. It compares this narrative
anxiety to apprehensions about the fate of history and memory that have recently been expressed by social
theorists, including Sven Birkerts, Pierre Nora, and Fredric Jameson. / Representations 85. Winter 2004
 The Regents of the University of California.     0734-6018 pages 1–20. All rights reserved. Send re-
quests for permission to reprint to Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division,
2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223.
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biographers, or critics set oﬀ on the trail of characters in an earlier historical period,
who turn out to be in some sense their prototypes; an eerie isomorphy emerges
between the contemporary and the ancestral layers of the story. Harold Pinter’s
screenplay for the 1981 ﬁlm version of The French Lieutenant’s Woman was one of the
earliest examples of this pattern. John Fowles had endowed his 1969 novel with an
obtrusively modern narrator, but the parallel between storylines in separate centu-
ries was Pinter’s addition—his way of translating narrative self-consciousness into
the dramatic medium. The premise of parallel lives was particularly fertile between
1985 and 1995. A selective list of examples from that period might include Peter
Ackroyd’s Hawksmoor (1985) and Chatterton (1987), A. S. Byatt’s Possession (1990),
Arturo Perez-Reverte’s The Flanders Panel (La tabla de Flandes) (1990), Tom Stop-
pard’s play Arcadia (1993), and the ﬁlm Dead Again (1991), written by Scott Frank
and directed by Kenneth Branagh. But it would be hasty to write an obituary for
this narrative mode: the recent ﬁlm versions of Possession and of Michael Cunning-
ham’s The Hours (1998) indicate that stories of parallel lives still attract a substan-
tial audience.
One needs to be cautious about periodizing the genre on the early side as well.
Not that it’s necessary to go back to Plutarch: in spite of their title, the Parallel Lives
produce an unrelated pleasure; Plutarch compares his noble Grecians and Romans
as if they could have been contemporaries, using congruences to point up ethical
universals. The genre under discussion, by contrast, takes it for granted that actual
repetition of the past is impossible; it attends to apparent echoes only in order to
foreground the transmission of historical memory. There is, on the other hand, a
real continuity between contemporary parallel-lives stories and gothic tradition.
Mid-century psychological gothics like Daphne Du Maurier’s Rebecca (1938) and
Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) implied that contemporary characters were pos-
sessed by ancestral models who led them to reenact the traumas of the past. Indeed,
gothic novels have been playing changes on the notion that the sins of the fathers
are visited on the sons ever since Horace Walpole’s Castle of Otranto; it is a favorite
gothic way of thinking about history. But ancestral possession carried very diﬀerent
class implications in older works than it does in recent examples. This goes without
saying for a writer like Ann Radcliﬀe, whose Oedipally oppressive villains also em-
body the dominance of the aristocracy or church. But even in mid-twentieth-cen-
tury psychological thrillers, the parallel between the present and the past is ex-
pressed as a compulsion to reenact a hollow masquerade. The layer of the story
hidden in the past dramatizes a set of values that ought to be vanishing; its power
to reach from the grave and enthrall middle-class protagonists suggests the covert
survival of systematic social distinction in a society that has ostensibly outgrown
such things. The protagonists’ goal is to throw oﬀ that enthrallment and content
themselves with a (presumably natural) middle-class identity. Not surprisingly,
these stories reached a broad middle-class audience; Rebecca, for instance, was an
important prototype for the large and proﬁtable gothic romance industry.4
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When texts from the 1980s and 1990s explore the premise of parallel lives, the
resurgence of the past is not felt as a threat. The characters in the older layer of the
story are portrayed sympathetically; in fact, the plot shuttles between two diﬀerent
epochs and two sets of protagonists, who receive roughly equal attention. Though
events in the contemporary story still eerily reproduce the past, that connection
ultimately deepens the living characters’ sensibilities and lifts them out of sordid or
humdrum surroundings. This is not to deny that their personal safety may be men-
aced along the way; inDead Again andThe Flanders Panel, for instance, the discovery
of a forgotten crime threatens to turn into reenactment of it. But the danger is now
overcome by closer identiﬁcation with the past, not by an eﬀort to throw oﬀ its spell.
The contemporary genre’s insistence on this conclusion is measurable by the moral
anomalies it is willing to create in order to reach it. As the title of Dead Again might
suggest, the ﬁlm ends happily when the past lives of its protagonists usurp and re-
place the drab present-day identities that were initially introduced to the audience.
Aesthete-murderers who craft a parallel between past and present crimes are the
most interesting characters in Hawksmoor and The Flanders Panel; though they ini-
tially take the form of detective stories, both novels end by moving back into the
villain’s consciousness and celebrating its mysterious persistence across time.
The parallel-lives premise leaves fewer moral loose ends in works like Stop-
pard’s Arcadia and Byatt’s Possession, which give up all attempt to make the past
menacing and instead create tension by letting the double-layered plot generate
dramatic irony. The audience sees contemporary characters misled by gaps in the
written record and wonders whether they will ever discover the full truth about
their predecessors. But all these versions of the parallel-lives story diﬀer from the
psychological gothic in refusing to take the oppressive weight of history seriously.
The real source of suspense lies in a struggle to remember and re-create a past
threatened by oblivion. That conﬂict is most intelligibly described from a point of
view located in the past, which is in fact the point of view that usually gets the last
word in these works: the real conﬂict is the struggle of the dead to transmit their
identities to the future.
In a sense this is a return to an older model of historical ﬁction. Writers of
historical novels have long been aware that readers’ fascination with the past is
partly composed of a desire to prove that collective memory is stronger than death.
As far back as Walter Scott’s Old Mortality, historical novels have hinted at their
own resemblance to funerary ritual.5 In staging spiritual possession and exhuma-
tion as redemptive events, works like Possession and Dead Again are perhaps less like
Hitchcock than like the spiritualist historical ﬁctions of George Sand and Edward
Bulwer-Lytton, which literalized collective memory as physical immortality.6 But
the parallel-lives stories that have sprung up over the last two decades revive the
historical novel’s traditional concern with mortality in order to make it a vehicle
for contemporary social anxieties—especially anxiety about the declining prestige
of culture relative to other forms of social distinction.7
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The cycle of death and resurrection in these works is also a quest for social
status. Though the connection is developed diﬀerently in each case, the outlines of
a pattern become clear. The protagonists in the earlier layer of the double plot are
always knowledge workers, and usually artists. They include, in the works so far
cited, a composer, a pianist, an architect, a novelist, two painters, two mathemati-
cians, and four poets. (I’ll have more to say about those interloping mathematicians
in a moment.) These characters soon discover that their profession does not confer
the expected prestige: because intellectual achievements are trumped by poverty
(Ackroyd’s Thomas Chatteron) or gender prejudice (Byatt’s Christabel LaMotte
and Stoppard’s Thomasina Coverley), or because the market for culture has shifted
under their feet (Roman Strauss, in Dead Again, can get paid for ﬁlm music but not
for the opera he wants to ﬁnish). Typically they console themselves with fantasies
of historical resurrection. LaMotte compares herself to Milton’s phoenix: ‘‘And
though her body die, her fame survives / A secular bird, ages of lives.’’8 Chatterton
has a dying vision of the painters andwriters whowill revive his name in subsequent
ages. ‘‘I will not wholly die,’’ he concludes. ‘‘I will live for ever.’’9
So far this is a familiar Romantic story: the neglected genius acquires immortal
life as an inﬂuence on cultural history. But the contemporary layers of parallel-
lives plots frustrate the expected resurrection and draw out the underlying conﬂict,
which now reveals itself more explicitly as a threat to the prestige of culture. To
begin with, the contemporary protagonists tend to be critics, biographers, or artists
who restore old paintings, instead of primary producers of culture; they feel them-
selves epigones, and that fact already suggests some interruption of their predeces-
sors’ legacy. Moreover, they are overshadowed within their own epigonal ﬁelds by
competitors more at ease with the mass media. The schemes of these competitors
often interfere with the immortality sought by the protagonists in the earlier layer
of the story: in Possession, for instance, the critic Mortimer Cropper steals texts and
memorabilia for his own collection, justifying it with a little sermon about elec-
tronic reproduction and ‘‘the museum of the future.’’ In Arcadia, Bernard Night-
ingale’s quest to be quoted in articles with headlines like ‘‘Bonking Byron Shot
Poet’’ muddies the historical waters and obscures the contributions of less famous
nineteenth-century ﬁgures who have become more interesting to the audience.10
In some cases, the threat to the immortality of the past also develops fatal conse-
quences in the present. Charles Wychwood, the unpublished twentieth-century
poet who is the protagonist of Chatterton, suﬀers from a brain disease that is at least
partly professional anxiety. A friend sums up the threat in these terms: ‘‘There is
no history any more. There is no memory. There are no standards to encourage
permanence—only novelty, and the whole endless cycle of new objects. And books
are simply objects—consumer items picked up and laid aside.’’11 After struggling
to refute this claim, Charles loses consciousness and collapses.
The lament is familiar: it sounds a bit like Sven Birkerts worrying about the
This content downloaded from 130.126.32.13 on Mon, 12 Aug 2013 12:12:14 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
5Stories of Parallel Lives
future of reading and ‘‘deep time’’ in The Gutenberg Elegies (1994), and a bit like
Fredric Jameson worrying about the fate of history in Postmodernism; or, The Cultural
Logic of Late Capitalism (1990). And in fact recent historical ﬁction does help illumi-
nate recent cultural theory. It is hardly a closely guarded secret that theorists have
lately been anxious about the material and social status of the cultural professions.12
The parallel-lives genre suggests that the same anxiety may also inform the elegy
for memory (or ‘‘historicity’’ or ‘‘deep time’’) that has lately ﬂourished in various
guises in diﬀerent academic disciplines. By staging the declining value of culture
as a threat to earthly immortality, stories of parallel lives remind us that modern
conceptions of culture have conferred prestige above all by identifying the cultured
individual with processes of historical change. These stories also demonstrate how,
as a consequence of that identiﬁcation, threats to the prestige of culture can be felt
as threats to the continuity of history. I propose that recent elegies for historical
memory reﬂect the disappearance, not of history or memory (which so far seem
to have survived the 1990s), but of something smaller that was nevertheless of
great value to college-educated professionals, and especially to cultural intellectu-
als. What we have lost is our ability to believe in cultural history as a form of collec-
tive immortality.
This may help explain why so many contemporary stories of parallel lives, in
attempting to shore up that belief, return in particular to the period between 1780
and 1880. The belief in historical immortality that seems now to be waning devel-
oped in that period. By subordinating universal standards to the idea of historical
change, Romantic historicism hollowed out older ideas of fame. ‘‘No humanmonu-
ment,’’ Johann Gottfried von Herder observed, ‘‘can endure intact and eternal, for
it was formed in the stream of generations only by the hands of a certain time for
that time.’’13 This is more than an empirical observation that reputations fade and
monuments crumble; the point is rather that no monument or ideal can hope to be
as fundamental, as absolute, as change itself. But in sealing the fate of Ozymandias,
historicism also opened up new forms of immortality. One could wager the future
not on immutability, but on ﬂux. If writers and thinkers were agents through which
history worked its changes, they could imagine themselves as unacknowledged leg-
islators of the world. They would acquire immortality not primarily through fame,
but by becoming part of the ceaseless transformation that is history. The more per-
fectly they crystallized the spirit of their own passing age, the more directly they
served history’s eternal logic. To call this identiﬁcation with collective perpetuity
‘‘immortality’’ is not necessarily a ﬁgure of speech. Observing that several Austra-
lian societies assign immortal souls to legendary ancestors but not to each member
of the tribe, Emile Durkheim argued that the notion of personal immortality origi-
nated by reifying ‘‘the perpetuity of the life of the group’’—a theory that also goes
some distance toward explaining aristocrats’ insistence on interring their dead un-
der cathedrals and pyramids.14 Heaven is a ﬁgure of speech for a symbolic appropri-
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ation of collective permanence—a passion, perhaps older than the idea of the soul
itself, that since the nineteenth century has expressed itself as identiﬁcation with
social change.
If identiﬁcation with change had only allowed writers to fantasize about their
own immortality, its signiﬁcance would have been limited. But nineteenth-century
philosophies of history taught a broader public to experience the same identiﬁca-
tion and the same sense of eternity. Auguste Comte’s religion of humanity encour-
aged believers to feel a correspondence between the stages of historical development
and the phases of their own lives; a ritual calendar in which each month corre-
sponded to a diﬀerent stage of history retraced the analogy each year. (September,
for instance, becomes ‘‘Gutenberg, or Modern Industry.’’)15 The subtler and more
widely practiced religion of culture also fostered emotional connections to vanished
ways of life. Those connections, after all, were what distinguished the nineteenth-
century ideal of culture from mere cultivation or taste. Culture was not just one
among many forms of social prestige; through historicism, it claimed to encompass
and transcend them all. Recall the mathematicians who interposed themselves in
that list of composers, painters, and poets. Recent stories of parallel lives are not
necessarily about ‘‘culture’’ in the narrow sense of the ﬁne arts. But neither are they
about ‘‘cultural capital’’ in the broad sense Pierre Bourdieu assigns that phrase,
which expands to include all forms of symbolic authority and educational attain-
ment.16 Accountants (no matter how highly credentialed) do not become protago-
nists of parallel-lives narratives; but mathematicians can (in Stoppard’s Arcadia) be-
cause they are understood to make discoveries and thereby embody history. We see
in this genre the persistence of a particular kind of cultural distinction that amounts
to identiﬁcation with history as a horizon of diﬀerence and change.
Here I part company from thinkers who have argued that culture derives its
cachet from nationalism or from attempts to regulate a national vernacular. Bill
Readings, for instance, sees transnational corporations as the main force dissolv-
ing the ideal of culture in the late twentieth century; reasoning backward from
that observation, he concludes that the nineteenth-century ideal of culture created
prestige by identifying the individual with an organic national tradition.17 What
this argument doesn’t suﬃciently acknowledge is the close aﬃnity between the
nineteenth-century ideal of culture and the cosmopolitan classicism that immedi-
ately preceded it. Though classicism was widely appropriated for nationalist pur-
poses (as in the French Revolution), even then the prestige it conferred was rooted
in its claim to transcend national identity. The nineteenth-century ideal of culture
retains a similar aspiration, though instead of embodying universality in an ostensi-
bly permanent classical ideal, it deﬁnes it as consciousness of historical diﬀerence.
The cultured individual becomes a temporal cosmopolitan, not by grasping the
eternal but by appreciating the singular and ephemeral. ‘‘To him,’’ as Walter Pater
put it, ‘‘all periods, types, schools of taste, are in themselves equal. In all ages there
have been some excellent workmen, and some excellent work done. The question
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he asks is always:—In whom did the stir, the genius, the sentiment of the period
ﬁnd itself ?’’18
This mode of appreciation, which values art for its representativeness, is ulti-
mately a way of using art to condense and master historical time. By encapsulating
the distinctive character of their periods, artworks make it possible to survey the
eternal succession that is history. To experience that succession, and retain it in the
summarized form of ‘‘culture,’’ is to possess immortality. That at any rate is what
Pater hints in his description of Leonardo’s La Gioconda. Like the historicist aes-
thete, she retains a residue of all the ages she has seen, without belonging to any
one of them.
She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire, she has been dead many
times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps
their fallen day about her; and traﬃcked for strange webs with Eastern merchants: and, as
Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy, and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all
this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and ﬂutes, and lives only in the delicacy with
which it has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands.
Pater goes on to explain that ‘‘the idea of humanity as wrought upon by, and sum-
ming up in itself, all modes of thought and life’’ is the modern equivalent of the
ancient ‘‘fancy of a perpetual life.’’19
Culture thus promised immortality to its consumers as well as its producers.
The cultured reader’s claim to have been ‘‘wrought upon by . . . all modes of
thought and life’’ paralleled the writer’s claim to embody the spirit of his or her
age. Both were ways of identifying with the eternity of history itself, which was
grasped, not as an overarching teleology or a principle of eternal recurrence, but
in the ephemeral singularities that distinguished an inﬁnite series of diﬀerent his-
torical forms receding into the past. As Carolyn Williams remarks in a study of
Pater’s ‘‘aesthetic historicism,’’ these disparate historical moments are uniﬁed only
through the critic’s retrospective gaze, and only because that gaze is treated as anal-
ogous to personal memory. ‘‘This structural analogy between personal memory
and historical retrospection . . . places the aesthetic critic beyond historical time,
even as he bends his attention to the absolute particularity of things in time.’’20
Though consumers were ostensibly expected to invent historical consciousness
for themselves by collecting and comparing works from diﬀerent periods, they were
in fact surrounded by guides that could abridge the process. One of the triumphs
of nineteenth-century art is its trick of simulating historical depth by evoking the
styles of vanished periods. Nineteenth-century works often explicitly teach their
readers or viewers how to feel stylistic diﬀerence as immortality; this is how Keats’s
evocation of Miltonic style in ‘‘Hyperion,’’ for instance, is related to Apollo’s deiﬁ-
cation by Mnemosyne at the end of that poem. Apollo becomes a god of song who
is distinctively modern (and therefore immortal) precisely by internalizing the
‘‘names, deeds, gray legends’’ of the past.21 The form of the artwork, as well as the
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process of production and reception, could thus provide an occasion for identiﬁca-
tion with collective eternity. In this essay, I’ll refer to that identiﬁcation as ‘‘cultural
immortality,’’ and to the social status it confers as ‘‘historicist culture.’’
By calling this form of distinction ‘‘historicist,’’ I mean that the social claim it
makes depends on a premise that began to be widely accepted only in the late eigh-
teenth century: that the manners and incommensurable standards of distinction
developed by diﬀerent societies are all equally ephemeral. This premise under-
writes a bracketing of both contemporary and classic models, and leaves conscious-
ness of historical diﬀerence and change as the only unchanging absolute. This
deﬁnition of ‘‘historicism’’ is admittedly broad; it is meant to stretch from Herder
to the most nominalistic and skeptical strains of contemporary practice. I think
that breadth of deﬁnition is necessary if we want to think critically—and self-
critically—about the way historicism underwrites its own peculiar kind of cultural
distinction. Methodological questions that make a great deal of diﬀerence in the
writing of history make less diﬀerence to its social standing. It doesn’t particularly
matter, for instance, whether the underlying processes of change are conceived in
cumulative or dialectical terms. La Gioconda’s absorptive gaze is not especially
dialectical, but since the dialectic preserves what it transforms, it can also suﬃce as
a vehicle for immortality. Nor does it matter—for the purposes of cultural distinc-
tion—whether immortality is imagined to rest on a material or ideal basis. As we
will see, Marxist and idealist versions of history lend themselves equally well to
fantasies of cultural immortality. It does matter, on the other hand, that history is
understood to involve an irreversible process of supersession. That is what makes
it necessary to replace eternal models with cultural memory; since the past that La
Gioconda knew can never return in the same form, it ‘‘lives only in the delicacy
with which it has moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and
the hands.’’
The distinction at stake in stories of parallel lives is deﬁnitely linked to histori-
cism. One of the notable features of this genre is its interest in the history of sci-
ence—paleontology in The French Lieutenant’s Woman, mathematics and thermo-
dynamics in Arcadia, paleontology and marine biology in Possession. This is a way
of asserting breadth, to be sure. But it is also a way of narrowing the deﬁnition
of culture by making clear that what counts as culture is not a generalized aes-
thetic sensibility but consciousness of historical diﬀerence (whether in the arts or
in the sciences). The threat to culture, moreover, is expressed in these stories as
a threat to the belief that participation in history makes one immortal. The sci-
ences of change—paleontology and thermodynamics—become in this connection
double-edged. As regions where discoveries can be made, they evoke a possibility
of immortality. But the discoveries themselves suggest a danger of obsolescence or
extinction.
Though The French Lieutenant’s Woman is not itself a story of parallel lives, the
interplay between its protagonist and its knowingly modern narrator serves many
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of the same purposes. Charles Smithson, Fowles’s protagonist, feels himself a ‘‘poor
living fossil’’: ‘‘the enormous apparatus rank required a gentleman to erect around
himself was like the massive armor that had been the death warrant of so many
ancient saurian species.’’22 At this point, the narrator intervenes to make clear that
fossilization threatens not only the nineteenth-century aristocracy, but any class
that deﬁnes itself by values other than wealth—including both ‘‘the tender human-
ists who begin to discern their own redundancy,’’ and the scientists who invented
the computer that is making those humanists redundant. The real threat is not
technology, but the ‘‘pursuit of money,’’ which fuels evolutionary change. ‘‘The sci-
entist is but one more form; and will be superseded’’ (234). In spite of the bleakness
of Fowles’s language, the analogy to evolution is ultimately consoling. It suggests
that ‘‘what dies is the form.Matter is immortal. There runs through this succession
of superseded forms we call existence a certain kind of afterlife’’ (233). Historical
consciousness is thus in the end conﬁrmed as the one principle that resists and tran-
scends the leveling power of commerce.
The rhetoric of evolutionary succession in The French Lieutenant’s Woman gives
its protagonist a documentably nineteenth-century vocabulary for worrying a
twentieth-century question: Can knowledge workers still locate themselves in the
main line of cultural ‘‘evolution’’—or are they now dead ends, throwbacks, living
fossils? In Arcadia, immortality is even more explicitly the problem. Bernard Night-
ingale is a literary critic who has published a ﬂashy but dubious claim about Byron:
H: If Bernard can stay ahead of getting the rug pulled till he’s dead, he’ll be a success.
V: Just like science . . . The ultimate fear is of posterity . . .
H: Personally I don’t think it’ll take that long.
V: . . . and then there’s the afterlife. An afterlife would be a mixed blessing. ‘‘Ah—
Bernard Nightingale, I don’t believe you know Lord Byron.’’ It must be heaven up there.23
The exchange is more than a joke about a researcher’s fear of being proved wrong
in heaven. The uneasiness it evokes is central to the comedy of Bernard’s character:
a scholar who fails to believe in the permanence of his subject, he instead chases
the transitory fame of talk shows and tabloid headlines, frankly out to grabwhatever
he can before death. If Bernard believed in the dialectic—vaster than empires and
more slow—that is supposed to underwrite the prestige of his class, he might con-
ceivably look forward to being corrected as an immortalizing sublation. But he
lacks faith in that sort of afterlife, and instead frantically converts history to celeb-
rity, as if it were a currency losing value. Though Bernard is a comic butt, the de-
clining value of that currency is a threat the play takes seriously.
The premise of parallel lives permits writers to acknowledge, but symbolically
resolve, that threat. On the literal level of the plot, traces of cultural history that
seemed to be permanently obscured by social or economic prejudice are recovered
and recorded. This already suggests a promotion of cultural over social and eco-
nomic sources of distinction. The structure of the double-layered plot also aﬃrms
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culture speciﬁcally as immortality: people who died long ago possess their cultural
descendants and live again through them, proving that history is still a process
by which the future transforms and partially resurrects the past. Characters who
champion the mass media and/or electronic reproduction may delay and compli-
cate the process of rebirth, but they pose that threat only so that it can be overcome.
In Possession, for instance, two contemporary researchers reconstruct (and re-
produce in their own persons) the personal and literary relationship between
Christabel LaMotte and Randolph Henry Ash, nineteenth-century poets. Their
eﬀorts are threatenedwhenMortimer Cropper, an advocate of electronic reproduc-
tion and of the ‘‘museum of the future,’’ secretly opens a grave and appropriates a
box containing a letter from LaMotte that was never delivered or read. In an ironic
reversal of his commitment to electronic publicity, Cropper plans to keep the letter
as a private possession. But the contemporary researchers are able to interrupt the
grave robbery and turn it into a resurrection: the letter is opened, part of LaMotte’s
identity that seemed irretrievably lost is recovered—and assimilated, as it happens,
by a researcher who turns out to be her biological descendant.
In short, the parallel-lives genre reassures readers who fear that their invest-
ment in culture is losing value, by staging a plot in which the contemporary threat
(diminished social status) is overcome by the original source of status (identiﬁcation
with the permanence of cultural history). But the genre’s literalization of cultural
immortality as exhumation and resurrection is by nomeans naive; it reveals a frank
understanding of the fantastic aspect of the original desire. For this reason, themost
thoughtful examples of the genre often end by returning to the past to take a linger-
ing look at some detail that failed to be preserved and reproduced.24 The postscript
to Possession, for instance, reveals that a secondmessage, fromAsh to LaMotte, went
astray in a way that will hide it forever from the intended recipient and from histori-
ans. In the ﬁnal scene of Arcadia, nineteenth-century characters spill over unob-
served into preparations for a twentieth-century costume party; the play ends with
two couples waltzing in Regency dress, on the same stage in diﬀerent centuries.
The image itself proposes that history is immortality: historical consciousness (in
the form of costume drama) seems to guarantee the eternal recurrence of each mo-
ment of experience. But the waltz equally dramatizes an emotional connection be-
tween the two nineteenth-century characters, which the audience knows will be
destroyed when one of them dies in a ﬁre to take place after the curtains close. The
twentieth-century characters who are waltzing never learn the full truth about that
nineteenth-century relationship, and are not themselves lovers. The visuals, in
short, evoke a longing to believe that cultural history immortalizes experience,
while the facts of the plot deny it.
It is not surprising to ﬁnd the same anxieties about the value of historicist cul-
ture in contemporary cultural theory. What is is slightly surprising is that theorists
are just as willing as novelists and screenwriters to represent this change as a threat
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to immortality. David Simpson has remarked that the desire ‘‘to speak with the
dead’’—in Stephen Greenblatt’s now-famous phrase—is a central animating prin-
ciple in contemporary criticism, and especially in the celebration of local knowl-
edge he deﬁnes as ‘‘the academic postmodern.’’ ‘‘What are the autobiographies,
the anecdotes, the conversations, the photographs (in even the most skeptical biog-
raphies), and the local knowledges . . . if not variations on the eﬀort at giving life
to what is otherwise threateningly (if also safely) dead?’’ For Simpson this is evi-
dence both of academics’ professional investment in the interminability of histori-
cal interpretation, and of their longing for a worldly eﬃcacy that interminable dis-
cussion seems forever to defer. The novels and works of criticism that revive the
dead address both needs at once by proving that after all ‘‘literature is life, and life
is literature.’’25 While I entirely concur with Simpson’s thesis, I think it is possible
to enlarge it. For though the desire to speak with the dead subsumes within it a
number of speciﬁcally professional imperatives, it is at the most general level noth-
ing less than a reaﬃrmation of cultural immortality. And it can be found not only
in the disciplines of history, anthropology, and literary studies, but in ﬁlms likeDead
Again and in works of popular criticism like Sven Birkerts’s The Gutenberg Elegies
(1994), that address an educated but not necessarily academic audience.
Birkerts argues that the transition from print to electronic culture entails dras-
tic phenomenological changes, of which the most uncanny is a ﬂattening of time
itself. One function of print culture was to ‘‘keep alive the dangerous and exhilarat-
ing idea that a life is not a sequence of lived moments, but a destiny.’’ Reading
thereby made it possible to move from ‘‘the idea of time as simple succession’’ to
the experience of ‘‘deep time.’’26 That last phrase is borrowed from John McPhee,
who used it to suggest that the time latent in rocks is so remote from the scale of
human life that it immobilizes mortality: ‘‘You free yourself a bit from the bound-
aries of human time. And then in a way you do not live at all, but in another way
you live forever.’’27 Birkerts’s descriptions of reading imply that the cultural time
latent on the printed page performs a similar transformation:
When I am at the ﬁnest pitch of reading, I feel as if the whole of my life—past as well
as unknown future—were somehow available to me. Not in terms of any high-deﬁnition
particulars (reading is not clairvoyance) but as an object of contemplation. At the same
time, I register a deﬁnite awareness that I am, in the present, part of amore extensive circuit,
a circuit channeling what Wallace Stevens called ‘‘the substance in us that prevails.’’ (84)
The passage begins by proposing that reading allows the reader to step out of the
ﬂow of time to contemplate her own life as a timeless object. This is a kind of per-
sonal immortality, and indeed the next page goes on to say that readingmakes one’s
‘‘soul’’ present to oneself. But reading also gives one access to a circuit that seems
to be ‘‘more extensive,’’ both because it is collective and because it extends back-
ward and forward in time. That circuit ‘‘channels’’ (in a sense somewhere between
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spiritualism and radio) a tacitly communal ‘‘substance in us that prevails.’’ Birk-
erts’s discussion of ‘‘deep time’’ thus turns out to involve an equation between cul-
ture and collective immortality like the one implicit in parallel-lives stories. And,
like the authors of those stories, he suggests that electronic communications
threaten to interrupt immortality (though he also appropriates the electronic ‘‘cir-
cuit,’’ interestingly enough, as a metaphor for historicist culture).
Anxiety about immortality is as widespread on the cultural left as it is in cos-
tume dramas or in Birkerts’s culturally conservative elegy for reading. When aca-
demics on the left reaﬃrm cultural immortality, they tend to do so by idealizing
scholarship’s power to rescue otherwise forgotten and silenced voices—an idealiza-
tion particularly noticeable in the growing subﬁeld of historical studies devoted to
the reconstruction of ‘‘memory.’’ The concept of collective memory is not new, but
recent academic discussions of the topic seem to form a distinct project dating
from the 1980s, indebted in particular to Pierre Nora’s seven-volume collection Les
lieux de me´moire (1984–92).28 In his inﬂuential introduction to that collection, Nora
argues that the proliferation of recording technologies and historical archives has
marginalized ‘‘memory,’’ which now survives only ‘‘in gestures and habits, un-
spoken craft traditions, intimate physical knowledge, ingrained reminiscences, and
spontaneous reﬂexes.’’29 This argument, which identiﬁes tradition with the body
and with subjectivity, might appear to have conservative implications. But as Ker-
win Klein has pointed out, it has received a surprisingly positive reception from
historians interested in ethnic and postcolonial identity who have interpreted
Nora’s concept of ‘‘memory’’ as ‘‘a form of counterhistory that challenges the false
generalizations in exclusionary ‘History.’ ’’30
This strange alliance becomes easier to comprehend if one interprets recent
academic interest in collective memory as a reaﬃrmation of the social status con-
veyed by historicist culture. The ostensible opposition between history andmemory
collapses in practice, because (as Nora stresses) memory no longer exists as living
tradition but only in lieux de me´moire—‘‘sites’’ of memory fragmented and fossilized
by history, ranging from Proust’s madeleine to the defunct revolutionary calendar.
The boundary betweenmemory and history is thus illusive; it functions mainly as a
rhetorical strategy for repackaging history. The boundary that Nora actually cares
about falls between a conception of history as the electronic transcription of events
(‘‘the concreteness of the recording, the visibility of the image’’) and a diﬀerent aes-
thetic centered on lieux de me´moire—fossils that both represent and partly redress
the obsolescence of memory by revealing the past’s double existence as corpse and
as eternity (8).
Lieux de me´moire are fundamentally remains: the ultimate embodiments of memorial con-
sciousness in a history that calls out for memory because it has abandoned it. What brings
the notion forth is the deritualization of our world—which produces, manifests, establishes,
constructs, decrees, and maintains by artiﬁce and by will a society fundamentally absorbed
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in its own transformation and renewal, by its very nature valuing the new over the ancient,
the young over the old, the future over the past. Museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals,
anniversaries, treaties, depositions, monuments, sanctuaries, fraternal orders—these are
mounds marking the edge of another age, illusions of eternity.31
This is a dirge for historicist culture. It expresses anxiety not about the loss of a
particular (simpler or more gracious) way of life but about a marginalization of
‘‘eternity’’ as such by the people who produce, establish, construct, decree, and
maintain the present. It also evokes an inherent opposition between eternity and
capitalism (emblematized particularly by electronic media): compare, for instance,
Andreas Huyssen’s claim that ‘‘capitalist culture with its continuing frenetic pace,
its television politics of quick oblivion, and its dissolution of public space in ever
more channels of instant entertainment is inherently amnesiac.’’32
Nora’s response to this threat closely resembles the way recent stories of parallel
lives respond to the devaluation of historicist culture: he seeks out fragments of the
past that were never fully incorporated into their own age, and which therefore
have the potential to wake to a second existence in the present. The fragmentary
quality of these lieux de me´moire represents the contemporary crisis of memory, while
their rebirth in the present symbolically resolves it. As a paradigmatic example,
Nora oﬀers the revolutionary calendar: an attempted intervention in collective
memory that qualiﬁes as a lieu de me´moire because it failed to endure as a living
tradition, and so could return for a second life in scattered allusions to Thermidor
or Brumaire—half memory, half object of historical study. More than anything
else, ‘‘this dual identity’’ deﬁnes lieux de me´moire: ‘‘moments of history are plucked
out of the ﬂow of history, then returned to it; no longer quite alive but not yet entirely
dead, like shells left on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded.’’ An-
nouncing that these fossils form ‘‘an unconscious organization of collectivememory
that it is up to us to bring to consciousness,’’ Nora deﬁnes a program for historians
that closely resembles the imperative to exhume unopened letters and consummate
unconsummated relationships that drives the detective protagonists of recent his-
torical ﬁction.33 Neither group is really concerned with living memory: they go in
search of what was stillborn, and give it belated life, in order to experience history’s
partial triumph over its own obsolescence.
The politics of Nora’s project are open to debate; though it has been welcomed
by the postcolonial left, it is ‘‘in its French context,’’ as Klein notes, ‘‘more nearly a
conservative plaint about the fragmentation of French identity.’’34 For a less equivo-
cal example of left cultural theory, one might turn to Fredric Jameson, whose cen-
tral theses about postmodernity can be understood as materialist formulations of
the anxiety other writers have expressed in terms of memory or deep time. Jameson
deﬁnes the problem as a ‘‘crisis in historicity’’—that is, a crisis in our ability to
perceive ‘‘the present as history.’’ The very facility of stylistic periodization in post-
modernity makes it diﬃcult for works of art to defamiliarize the present or to repre-
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sent its relation to the past. According to Jameson, postmodernity ‘‘has forgotten
how to think historically’’ because capital has ﬁnally succeeded in commodifying
time itself, congealing historical diﬀerence into retro style.35
Though Jameson formulates the crisis in insistently material terms, he too rep-
resents it as a threat to immortality. Postmodern amnesia is a problem because his-
tory is necessary ‘‘for the resurrection of the dead of anonymous and silenced gener-
ations.’’ Since it is ‘‘the retrospective dimension necessary for any vital reorientation
of our collective future,’’ this ritual remembrance of the dead also guarantees the
future vitality of the community—which, as Durkheimwould point out, has always
been the rationale for funerary rituals.36 Of course, Jameson is talking about poli-
tics. But for Jameson, the point of political interpretation is really to do what funer-
ary ritual does in religion: to reaﬃrm the continuity of collective existence. This
theme was already central to The Political Unconscious (1981):
Only Marxism can give us an adequate account of the essential mystery of the cultural past,
which, like Tiresias drinking the blood, is momentarily returned to life and warmth and
allowed once more to speak, and to deliver its long-forgotten message in surroundings ut-
terly alien to it. . . . These matters can recover their original urgency for us only if they are
retold within the unity of a single great collective story . . . only if they are grasped as vital
episodes in a single vast unﬁnished plot.37
A revenant who represents historical diﬀerence as wisdom from beyond the grave,
Tiresias is in this passage a bit like Pater’s La Gioconda—though admittedly, a
Marxist critic’s identiﬁcation with historical time is not interchangeable with an
aesthete’s. Jameson is on his guard, as a matter of course, against any reiﬁcation of
history as ‘‘culture’’ one could acquire. But this does not mean that he scorns cul-
tural immortality: it means only that he understands what it is. Since Jameson
frankly acknowledges a desire to overcome death by identifying with ‘‘a single great
collective story,’’ he doesn’t need to disguise that desire as a celebration of reading,
or of somatic memory. But he has as much reason as Birkerts or Nora to be troubled
by a decline in ‘‘the mystery of the cultural past,’’ because Marxist literary interpre-
tation still needs to show that superseded social forms speak to the present, not in
spite of but (herein lies the mystery) because of their contingent speciﬁcity.
This is a need that Marxism shares with other forms of historicism. It’s true
that there is a utopian impulse in Jameson (and of course in Marx), but ‘‘the mys-
tery of the cultural past’’ he describes does not depend on any particular eschatalog-
ical premise. It requires only that apparently dated social forms be understood to
carry—precisely in their ‘‘deadness’’—an urgent message for the present. Jameson
says that this is possible only if social forms ‘‘are grasped as vital episodes in a single
vast unﬁnished plot,’’ but the word unﬁnished concedes more than at ﬁrst appears.
In principle it says only that the story is not over, but in practice Jameson does not
pretend to know whether (let alone when or how) history will end. It seems possible
that Tiresias will have to keep drinking the blood in order to recast his message for
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a potentially endless succession of ages. Moments of the past are ‘‘grasped as vital
episodes,’’ then, not in the sense that they are subordinated to a determinate teleol-
ogy, but only in the sense that their contingent speciﬁcity is redeemed through an
(ever-changing) relation to the present. In the same way, the future that explodes
our own age’s ephemeral assumptions will presumably immortalize them and give
them meaning in the very act of situating them as a characteristic ‘‘episode’’ of its
own history. In short, the consolations of cultural immortality are promised not just
by the ‘‘memory’’ industry, or byMarxism, but by historicism itself. If we wanted to
avoid making this promise, historicists would have to become not more but less
nominalistic. If one could discern universal standards or stable teleologies, the idio-
syncrasies of a particular historical moment could (by comparison) be revealed as
blind alleys and digressions. But since the appetite for collective permanence is too
strong to be denied altogether, the more one subordinates universals to the process
of change, themore one tends to imply—in practice—that every historicalmoment
is eternalized through its singular relation to the future that transforms it.
In short, I don’t see any way to break the link between historicism and what I’ve
called ‘‘historicist culture’’: the social status conferred by a connection to eternity,
glimpsed paradoxically in the ephemeral and local. But I also don’t see any urgent
need to break that link. My attitude here is analogous to John Guillory’s attitude
to canon formation. One wants to ensure equal access to cultural capital, but it
would be a quixotic project to attempt to abolish cultural capital altogether by in-
sisting that people refrain from from making judgments about literature—or, in
this case, from seeking immortality in historicism.38 The problem posed by recent
defenses of immortality arises not from the rhetoric of immortality, but from histori-
cists’ reluctance to acknowledge their investment in it. Unacknowledged aspira-
tions can become sources of defensive distortion, because perceived threats to the
aspiration have to be translated into a threat to something else. Recently, histori-
cists’ anxiety about the depreciation of their investment in cultural immortality
seems to be generating an apocalyptic narrative about a threat to time itself. Birk-
erts’s elegy for deep time, Nora’s narrative about the disappearance of memory,
and Jameson’s account of a crisis in historicity are symptoms of this displacement.
There is, at any rate, a great deal of textual evidence inside these theories to suggest
anxiety about cultural immortality, and not much evidence in the world outside
them to suggest that the ﬂattening of time and history they describe is actually tak-
ing place.
Consider the best version of the argument, which in my view is Jameson’s. The
ﬂowering of the parallel-lives genre has special relevance here, for though its protag-
onists share Jameson’s anxieties, the genre itself tends to refute his thesis of a post-
modern crisis in historicity. Jameson’s evidence for that crisis included the observa-
tion that the historical novel and the costume ﬁlm have ‘‘fallen into disrepute and
infrequency’’; an observation that went to print just as both forms were entering a
prolonged boom in sales and prestige.39 Moreover, the historical novels of the late
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1980s and 1990s were notably clear-eyed and materialistic about historical diﬀer-
ence. Sally Shuttleworth has pointed out that ‘‘the retro-Victorian novel’’ is ex-
tremely careful ‘‘to oﬀer a broad materialist picture of Victorian culture’’ rather
than a mere ‘‘drama of ideas’’ (262).40 One could add that historical novels relying
on the parallel-lives premise are particularly good at representing ‘‘the present as
history.’’ Their constant shuttling between centuries often makes the present look
stranger than the past. Of the charges one might level against ﬁction written in the
last two decades, the claim that it ‘‘has forgotten how to think historically’’ seems
to me one of the least plausible.
Contemporary cultural theorists have used crises of ‘‘deep time’’ or ‘‘memory’’
or ‘‘historicity’’ to explain the devaluation of culture. I have suggested that causality
is more likely to be ﬂowing in the other direction: theorists perceive a crisis in histo-
ricity because the prestige of cultural immortality has been declining. But this
leaves a question unanswered: if we have not forgotten how to think historically,
why is the prestige of identiﬁcation with cultural history declining in the ﬁrst place?
That question deserves more discussion than I can give it here. But one clue lies, I
suspect, in the villainous role historical ﬁction and cultural theory have lately ac-
corded electronic media of communication (especially ﬁlm and television). I prefer
to bracket Birkerts’s claim that those media diﬀer from print culture in profound
temporal ways. The jury is still out on that question, and this is not the place to
decide it. But it is clear that technologies for the reproduction of sounds and images
have, if nothing else, changed the reception of older cultural forms. It is not just
that electronic media have cut into their audiences. More important, the visible
momentum of mass culture makes it diﬃcult for the public to believe that the stylis-
tic evolution of poems (or plays, or paintings) still represents something important
about the course of history. The prestige of those cultural forms depended as much
on a belief in their synecdochic relationship to history as on the sheer size of the
audience. But that belief was showing cracks in the 1960s, and by the 1990s it had
altogether disappeared.41
It was not logically necessary for the marginalization of particular cultural
forms to discredit the whole idea of cultural history, but the twentieth-century di-
vide between high culture and popular entertainment seems to have forced many
observers to draw that conclusion. In schools and universities, students learn to
approach works in older media as emblems of a historical period, and thereby of
cultural history in general. A poem is deﬁned in advance as a historical document,
whether or not it chooses (like ‘‘The Wasteland’’) to remind its readers of that fact.
Television and moving pictures, by contrast, until lately appeared to have no his-
tory—or at any rate, no history that could be a vehicle for culture. So when mid-
twentieth-century audiences stopped pretending to care about high culture’s stud-
ied simulation of a dialectic, they may have concluded, not that modernism had
misdescribed the course of cultural history, but that immediacy was more impor-
tant than culture.
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The historicist turn in contemporary ﬁction and drama springs in part from
writers’ recognition that the audience has stopped caring about the dialectic of style
in older media. Since formal experiments that sought to construct and embody a
new Zeitgeist were no longer conferring prestige, plays and novels turned in on
themselves to represent the project of historicist culture (instead of acting it out as
avant-gardism). The parallel-lives premise, which puts historicist culture in jeop-
ardy in order to rescue it from oblivion, is one way of representing that project. But
it is not necessarily a defensive gesture; the same plot premises that look like a turn
inward in the genres of ﬁction and drama can look, in the context of ﬁlm, like a
newly aggressive assertion of that genre’s right to possess and distribute historicist
culture. Consider the evocation of noir style in ﬁlms like Chinatown,Dead Again, and
L. A. Conﬁdential. These ﬁlms posit an audience that knows something about the
history of the genre and thereby achieve an eﬀect of mystery that comes not just
from their plots (which uncover bodies buried more or less deeply in the past), and
not just from the chiaroscuro they borrow frommid-century ﬁlm, but from the par-
allel between these evocations of lost authenticity on the levels of plot and of style.
The detective protagonist can be all the more weary because we sense he has been
on the job a long time; the shadows that surround him begin to evoke the passage
of time. The allure of these works comes, in other words, from their ability to sug-
gest that they contain within themselves the history of their genre. That project
echoes the reassertion of historicist culture implicit in the parallel-lives premise—
and sometimes, for instance in Dead Again, coincides with it.
Roman Strauss, played by Kenneth Branagh, is a European composer made
up to look strikingly like Laurence Olivier. His reincarnation as a plastic artist (and
his eventual recovery of lost social status) are triumphs over the journalists and ﬁlm
directors who hounded him in postwar Los Angeles, but the evocation of Olivier
also implies that ﬁlm now contains within itself the temporal depth that constitutes
culture. Kenneth Branagh’s physical transformations (from successful European
composer to exiled, jailed composer to gawky, earnest American gumshoe) have a
similar double function: they evoke anxiety about the decline of historicist culture
but reassert that culture in the form of historically savvy ﬁlm (ﬁg. 1).42
This is the kind of work that for Jameson suggests a chilling postmodern shift
from the history of substance to a history of empty style. It is true that the novels
and ﬁlms produced over the last two decades have not always grounded their evoca-
tion of historical diﬀerence in substantive social detail. Celebrations of postmodern
narrative as a radical decentering of history are for that reason too sanguine. But
nineteenth-century historicism also had its substantive and its purely stylistic as-
pects. Dead Again should be compared not to Stendhal or Scott but to Keats’s ‘‘Hy-
perion,’’ which invokes Miltonic style for many of the same reasons Dead Again in-
vokesHitchcock. For a contemporary Scott, one could look to Byatt or Fowles.What
diﬀerentiates recent historical ﬁction from its nineteenth-century predecessor is not
a shift from social substance to style, but mainly a sense in recent works that histori-
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 1. The metamorphosis of historicist culture embodied by Kenneth
Branagh in Dead Again  Paramount Pictures. All rights reserved.
Photo Courtesy of Paramount Pictures and the Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.
cal consciousness and memory are themselves under siege. That sense of crisis pro-
duces the characteristic double-layered plot, where history appears to die and be
reborn. But that death need not be taken literally; it may only reﬂect the necessity
of rebuilding a nineteenth-century system of cultural distinction that lost value
when the twentieth century stopped taking its oﬃcial high culture seriously.
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